This article examines the divergence in the EU's strategies towards neighbours. The goal is to connect different EU neighbourhood initiatives into one framework in making a correlation between national and supranational levels. The distinction between bilateralism/multilateralism and Russia inclusion/Russia exclusion is made within both levels.
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the divergence of the EU's strategies towards neighbours. The goal is to connect different EU neighbourhood initiatives into one framework in making correlation between national and supranational levels. The argument is made that national preferences and interests precondition a variety of the EU's neighbourhood initiatives and create a web in the EU's neighbourhood policy filled with many contradictions. The main objectives of this article are: As well, the contradictions (Balfour, 2006; Danreuther, 2008) and paradoxes (Casier, 2008) have already been noted. Joenniemi (2003, 2008) examined the EU's geopolitical development models which I also utilize in this article. My idea is to combine the EU's different strategies towards neighbours into one framework in making the correlation between the national activities of member states and EU's official neighbourhood policies. Therefore, two levels-national and supranational-have been interlinked. The distinction between bilateralism/multilateralism and Russia inclusion/Russia exclusion is made within both levels. This distinction is not newly introduced but I use it within both levels in making the framework for their connection. The focus is on a comparison between the EU's different neighbourhood policies (also involving currently launched new initiatives, the Black Sea synergy and Eastern partnership). Within the national level, the regional ‗activeness' of two small member states, Finland and Lithuania, was selected as they reflect different strategies of the EU. They illustrate the argument that even small states can impact or form EU's external policies. The
Eastern Europe and Eastern neighbourhood is perceived not in a geographical sense but in a wider context including three South Caucasus countries, since they are involved in the European Neighbourhood policy and constructed as the Eastern Precisely positions of member states towards Russia and the differences between Russia inclusion and Russia exclusion strategies illustrate the current preferences of EU member states. This division of the strategies, e.g. the current ‗no one voice from EU side' in relation with Russia and the veto right in the foreign policy decision making system, indicate the shortages of CFSP. All these main issues will be discussed in this article.
For a long time European enlargement policy was the most efficient tool in promoting security, stability, peace and social/economic prosperity in Europe. But as the European Union emphasizes this cannot be the policy forever. The newly assumes by definition the existence of, and interaction between, more than one party, it is mostly the EU that sets the terms and determines the conditions of the relation‖. 5 Therefore, conditionality elements are being implemented by the EU.
Several techniques, which are included in European Neighbourhood policy, were used in pre-accession policy. 6 The role of European Commission, as making regular reports on neighbours' achievements, programmes' implementation, negotiating and determining the priorities for the Action plans, assistance 7 , conditionality policy, is very similar as in enlargement policy 8 . The other element of enlargement strategy -differentiation -is also evident in European Neighbourhood policy. The
Commission underlines that -negotiations with Ukraine and Marocco on an 4 In 2002 President of the Commission Romano Prodi said famous phrase -Everything but institutions‖. . These scientists also emphasize that EU currently is practising ‗buffering logic' towards neighbours which means -exclusion and threat rather than inclusion‖ 20 . Thus, the EU gives greater attention to the security threats posed by its -neighbours rather than identifying the potential for change and transformation.‖ 21 This integration-security dilemma is also intensified by the Russian factor. It is very much in connection with the EU's pragmatic interests, primarily energy. The EU's growing dependence on energy resources coming from its neighbours is a frightening fact for many member states. Energy policy is involved in all neighbourhood initiatives and within bilateral Action plans it was stated that an article should be created on energy policy when signing Association agreements. 22 Still, consensus has not been made in this area and especially within EU-Russia relations.
The current EU policy can be described as pragmatism versus normative policy; opening versus strengthening the borders and Russia inclusion/exclusion strategies. All these implications are evident in the EU's foreign policy and decision making system within second pillar. The biggest problem of the CFSP is that all the member states see the EU primarily as an opportunity and instrument for reaching national foreign policy goals. It is natural that there are many disagreements between the block of 27 members. The right for veto in the second pillar opens 16 
EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD OF 'OLYMPIC RINGS'?
Two new EU's initiatives -Black Sea Synergy and Eastern partnership -have the goal to create regionalism in the neighbourhood area and bring various regional actors in the cooperation framework. A strategy for regionalism seems most suited to the Union's interests because instruments of good governance is being used within regional and sub-regional cooperation, also -creates more security on the Union's borders‖. 29 Promotion of regional cooperation and regional integration policies is tied in with EU's self development. Therefore the European Union promotes the development for regional cooperation in validating the example of success and experience of European Community. The same rhetoric was also used in pre-enlargement strategy towards Central and Eastern Europe. At that time
European Commission highlighted the importance of regional cooperation as a tool stimulating candidate countries integration into the EU. 30 But as the example of three Baltic States' efforts to strengthen regional cooperation showed it is very hard to develop regional integration. While the Baltic States felt pressure to promote 27 Christopher Browing and Pertti Joenniemi, supra note 10. Uvalic, regional cooperation initiatives are criticized because of weak effectiveness for regional stabilization and growth, and vulnerable implementation, which are far away from the ambitions and official rhetoric. 33 Even though there were very few successful regional cooperation cases (Nordic integration, European Community and the Northern Dimension sometimes is named as such) the European Union does not refuse the further development of regional cooperation and multilateral framework. The perspectives of ‗dimensionalism' in Europe are directly related to EU enlargement, since the increasingly diversified political space spells further differentiation. The more compex the EU is becoming intrinsically, the more space will be needed for regional groupings inside it, with each increasingly likely to seek more autonomy in making contact with non-EU members. This will -prepare the meeting agendas in close cooperation with the EU Presidency and partners and will chair the meetings‖. 49 The other similarity is that activities are organized within sector specific platforms, which are also very similar, mainly involving democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU sectoral policies; Energy security; and contacts between people. Realistic core objectives within each platform are being developed, which -will be updated periodically‖. 50 These governance practices are also being activated within Black Sea
Synergy. This initiative has already developed the networks between various sectors of civil society organizations. These networks and exchanges/ meetings are coordinated by newly launched Black Sea forum. . But it should be underlined that in the Baltic sea region all these regional linkages was successfully created not just because NDI accelerated and promoted these processes but they were determined and run together with Europeanization/ integration into EU processes.
The other issue is that in the Black Sea region can be seen the similar scenario of EU involvement in the region to the one in the Baltic Sea area. Firstly, membership in the EU and NATO.
The European Commission emphasizes that creation of links between Civil
Society Organizations improves -their capacity for advocacy and promote confidence building in areas of protracted conflict‖. 58 The European Commission expects that these processes will help to solve the problems and brings different states and non-state actors in the region for common dialogue. Several projects have already linked civil society organizations in ‗frozen conflicts' areas. 59 Still the situation remains unchanged. All these efforts to promote the local, sub-regional, regional and inter-regional cooperation within involvement of civil society organizations is related with the building of ‗bottom-up' regionalism and it is in contrast to bilateral state-centrism. This could be evaluated as a very positive process, because it stimulates the emergence of various regional actors but it is interesting that this bottom-up regionalism is being promoted from outside the Commission or from other states. Therefore, regional initiatives even though within official discourse could be explained as creating theoretical model of interesting processes are the emergence of regional and inter-regional cooperation.
Here the distinction at the same interlink can be made between supranational level (as Commission has an evident role either in regional cooperation or in relation with neighbours on bilateral framework) and national level. Within the latter level the processes of inter-regional cooperation are even more evident and also promote their national strategies. Furthermore, the Commission also facilitates member states involvement into developing official EU's policies. -The Black Sea member states would remain the EU's main interlocutors, whether in a bilateral framework or during discussions at the regional level, the EC's contribution will continue to be provided through the established sectoral programmes managed by the Commission.‖ 60 Therefore, national action for the promotion of regional cooperation is as important as the EU's role, just as it was within Baltic Sea region.
NATIONAL ACTIVENESS IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD SPACE
The success for building regionalism/regionalization in Baltic Sea area was built upon the example of the Nordic countries' efforts to strengthen regional Competition between Nordic states in suggesting regional initiative also accelerated regionalism in the Baltic Sea area; however, the accordance and consensus for the regional activities and efforts to strengthen created initiatives involved both elements competition and common action. 
SMALL STATES' IMPACT ON THE EU'S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
Choice for active regional roles by both countries was made after joining the EU. In 1995 Finland became a member of the EU and the changes both in Finland's neighbourhood (demise of the Soviet Union) and the participation in the EU were reasons for rethinking Finland's foreign policy. According to Nyunr Tin, the best way for small states successful foreign policy implementation is orientation on regional 
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